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Premodern Sino-Vietnamese relations may be described by three systems of engagement that I 
have labeled Strong China/Weak Vietnam, Weak China/Strong Vietnam, and Strong 
China/Strong Vietnam. These three states of interaction appear at various points, beginning with 
Vietnamese encounters with the Qin empire (221–206 b.c.e.) through the early modern era. 
Brantly Womack has already described the historical Sino-Vietnamese relationship as politically 
“asymmetrical” with China playing the strongman role, and the three relational equilibriums 
described here do not contradict Womack's thesis. Instead, I explore how the generally 
asymmetrical states of affairs were molded by historical context and the specific ambitions of 
elite in the frontier region. While the general conditions of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship 
were asymmetrical, the choices available to Chinese and Vietnamese leaders in different periods 
varied widely. 
 




Well before US military planners feared Beijing's intervention in Vietnam's second Indochinese 
war, relations between Vietnam and China held a great regional significance. As reflected in Ho 
Chi Minh's blunt 1946 comment to scholar Paul Mus that enduring a little more French malodor 
is worth avoiding a lifetime of the same from China, fears of northern domination have long 
shaped Vietnamese foreign policy (Duiker 2000, 361). Examining the nature of Sino-Vietnamese 
relations throughout the premodern period, however, one finds a flexible but durable system of 
engagement. Within this generally stable system of relations, one may isolate three political 
equilibrium conditions, labeled in this article as Strong China/Weak Vietnam, Weak 
China/Strong Vietnam, and Strong China/Strong Vietnam, respectively.1 These three states of 
 
1 I wish to thank Stephan Haggard (UCSD) for suggesting this framework of analysis during our 2011 workshop at 
the University of Southern California, "Was There a Historical East Asian International System? Impact, Meaning, 
interaction appear at various points, beginning with Vietnamese encounters with the Qin empire 
(221-206 B.C.E.) through the early modern era. Brantly Womack has already described the 
historical Sino-Vietnamese relationship as politically "asymmetrical" with China playing the 
strongman role, and the three relational equilibriums described here do not contradict the general 
trend described by Womack (2006, 4-7). Instead, I wish to explore here how the generally 
asymmetrical states of affairs were molded by historical context and the specific ambitions of the 
elite in the frontier region. While the general conditions of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship 
were asymmetrical, the choices available to Chinese and Vietnamese leaders in different periods 
varied widely. 
 
The larger narrative of Sino-Vietnamese relations has long revolved around border negotiations, 
either in terms of territory or spheres of political authority, by the designated leaders of 
Vietnamese and Chinese polities.2 This narrative could, in fact, be constructed in alternate ways: 
focusing on the rise and fall of frontier trade, for example, as a source of anxiety for rulers of 
both northern and southern regimes. Officially sanctioned trade between the two central courts 
respected the political division at the frontier, while unofficial trade among subaltern 
communities flowed easily through the region when restrictions were lifted. Moreover, cultural 
exchange and the flow of ideas passed easily across a border invisible to most frontier 
inhabitants, but these ideas, such as Buddhism, would in turn lead to social structures and 
political practices that reinforced the separation between northern (Chinese) and southern 
(Vietnamese) polities. The frontier as a line of division and the frontier as a contact zone existed 
simultaneously between China and Vietnam after the late eleventh century (Anderson 2007). The 
dual nature of the frontier, in turn, affected conditions in the three equilibrium conditions 
mentioned above. 
 
I will demonstrate that many aspects of Sino-Vietnamese relations changed with the outcome of 
tribute missions sent north to Chinese courts by Vietnamese envoys. The gift-based diplomatic 
protocol of the tribute system, as China's imperial-period foreign policy is best known in the 
West, had shaped the outer relations of polities located on the North China Plain since the Zhou 
period (ca. 1122–256 B.C.E.), and a similar framework for peripheral relations had been 
expanded southward with the initial expansion of the Qin empire (221-206 B.C.E.). Sino-
Vietnamese tributary bonds may suggest to some readers an imperialistic relationship when 
viewed through the lens of the more recent past, but tribute missions were much more fluid 
opportunities to negotiate the balance of status and authority existing between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese rulers. The Chinese emperor as the Son of Heaven (tianzi) may have regarded his 
role as maintaining a universal political authority with himself at its pinnacle, but there was room 
in the system for adjustment based on local circumstances. At the start of the three political 
equilibrium conditions examined here, Strong China/Weak Vietnam, Weak China/Strong 
Vietnam, and Strong China/Strong Vietnam, we have evidence of tribute missions sent north to 
recalibrate the relationship. The titles granted Vietnamese rulers by Chinese emperors were 
 
and Conceptualization," organized by David Kang and Amitav Acharya and sponsored by the Korean Studies 
Institute (USC). I also wish to thank John Whitmore for his comments on a late draft of this article. 
2 Please note that prior to the twentieth century modem names for the countries examined in this article and their 
inhabitants are not relevant. However, as a shorthand to simplify our discussion of various geographical regions, I 
have used the terms Vietnamese and Vietnam to describe persons and places located near or to the south of the Red 
(Hồng) River delta, and the terms Chinese and China to describe persons and places associated with courts and 
political centers north of the Red River delta. 
cumulative, indicating the varying degrees of association the two courts had shared throughout 
their histories. The titles and honorific fiefs of land offered with each visit by Vietnamese envoys 
also affected the local standing of southern rulers among their southern neighbors. In this manner 
Vietnamese leaders negotiated their status within the Chinese tribute system in such a way as to 
establish regional independence while maintaining a check on Chinese incursions. 
 
Table 1. Periods in Sino-Vietnamese Relations 
Period Equilibrium Characteristics 
Pre-Qin empire, before 
221 B.C.E. 
Strong China/Weak Vietnam Formal relationship undeveloped, autonomous polities with 
little interaction 
Qin-Han period, 221 
B.C.E.–220 C.E. 
Strong China/Strong Vietnam 
(207-111 B.C.E.), Strong 
China/Weak Vietnam 
Nam Việt autonomous but weaker than Han empire (early 
tributary ties), trade and economic exploitation were primary 
factors in relationship 
Period of northern 
disunion, 220–581 
Weak China/Strong Vietnam Weak northern regimes less influential, autonomous polities 
emphasized trade over tributary relationship 
Sui-Tang period, 581–907 Strong China/Weak Vietnam Vietnam annexed by Chinese empire, political institution 
developed within tributary context 
Five Dynasties period of 
disunion, 907–960 
Weak China/Strong Vietnam Absence of strong northern regimes allowed for the emergence 
of autonomous base of political power in Vietnam 
Đinh-Trần period, 968–
1400 
Strong China/Strong Vietnam Vietnamese regimes continued to maintain tributary ties to 
protect local autonomy; trade and tribute both important  
Ming annexation, 1407–
1427 




Strong China/Strong Vietnam, 
Strong China/Weak Vietnam 
Lê court strong domestically while remaining active in 
tributary engagement with China, relations more complex in 
"Southern and Northern Courts" (1533-1592) period; Opium 
War aftermath and French colonization of Indochina resulted 
in Weak China/Weak Vietnam; modern period brings changes 
 
It is important to note that Chinese and Vietnamese rulers seldom administered their states on the 
basis of an idealized world order, but instead considered both ideological and non-ideological 
factors in their decisionmaking. Trade and access to trade items from the South Seas 
(Nanhai/Biển Đông) region through Vietnamese channels had long been an important factor in 
the relationship. As Kenneth Hall notes, "early Chinese political interest in Vietnam was a 
consequence of the desire among China's rulers to secure southern trade routes and to gain access 
to southern luxury goods, which included pearls, incense, drugs, elephant tusk, rhinoceros horn, 
tortoiseshell, coral, parrots, kingfishers (and) peacocks" (Hall 1999, 261). From the third century 
B.C.E. through the eighth century C.E., Jiaozhi (a collective term for the maritime ports of 
northern Vietnam and coastal Guangxi), and not Guangzhou, was the primary conduit for all 
maritime trade arriving from Southeast Asia (Li 2011, 40). Tributary missions were not thinly 
veiled attempts to promote trade, as earlier scholars of the Chinese tribute system once argued 
(Fairbank and Teng 1941, 137). Nonetheless, there were trading opportunities present during the 
ritual performance of tributary protocol. Moreover, managing the Sino-Vietnamese frontier 
involved the development of relations with many independent ethnic groups, which resided on 
their respective sides of the imprecise borderline in the rugged mountain region that separated 
the Đại Việt kingdom from the Chinese empire. For the Vietnamese leadership, control of their 
northern frontier involved more than simply promoting trade or flexing military muscle. In 
periods of regional dominance, particularly during the early Lê (1428-1788) and early Nguyễn 
(1803-1945) dynasties, the Vietnamese court established a network of tributary ties with 
neighboring kingdoms and principalities as its vassals. Therefore, within the three equilibrium 
frameworks one must take into account various practical elements, involving trade objectives, 
frontier security, and domestic political considerations. Table 1 summarizes these equilibrium 
conditions. 
 
Below I will offer examples from the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations to illustrate the three 
equilibrium conditions mentioned above. The principles of harmony and hegemony are at play in 
all three equilibrium conditions, but the choices available to leaders of the larger northern 
regimes and local chieftains along the frontier differed widely. In these differences we can 
discern the characteristics of the relationship that allowed a smaller power such as the premodern 
Vietnamese state to survive on the periphery of various Chinese empires. 
 
Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Strong China/Weak Vietnam 
 
The periods of Strong China that had an impact on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship include the 
most well-known periods of dynastic rule: the Han, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties. 
These are the periods of political "asymmetry" of the sort Brantly Womack describes in his 
work, and there is little reason to argue with this general framework (Womack 2006). However, 
this broad category hides as much about the relationship as it reveals. Within these periods we 
find Chinese and Vietnamese leaders responding more often to domestic or purely personal 
political concerns than they are simply addressing each other's strengths or weaknesses. China 
was rarely the weaker partner in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, because northern regimes 
often wielded greater resources and larger populations to mobilize. However, there were periods 
of relative strength and weakness that would affect relations. 
 
The asymmetrical relationship between China and Vietnam within the Chinese tribute system 
was based on the assumption that the emperor wielded universal authority, and Vietnamese 
leaders sought to establish local authority in the context of this tributary relationship. However, 
as noted above, the Chinese imperial leadership could ignore the particulars of ideological purity 
to adopt a more flexible approach in specific foreign policy and frontier management decisions. 
Wang Gungwu has contended that Chinese rulers in the Song period, designated in this study as 
a Strong China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium, were required to disregard realpolitik to allow room 
for the idealized world order at the core of the tribute system (Wang 1983, 62). I have argued 
that emperors of Strong China frequently assumed that "adherence to a universalistic notion of 
rulership actually required hegemonic expression" (Anderson 2007,25). In periods of imperial 
strength, such as the height of the Tang Dynasty (618–906), regional peace remained in effect as 
long as it was supported by the central authority's potential for coercive intervention; regional 
harmony could justify military conquest, as well as territorial expansion, for the sake of regional 
pacification (Pan 1997, 22). Strong Chinese rulers found the source of their authority both in 
leading by virtuous example and in employing coercive force. Weak Vietnamese leaders would 
not openly reject this Chinese position of universal superiority, thus avoiding direct 
confrontation. Yet the reality of premodern lines of communication regularly offered the 
Vietnamese leaders plenty of time between encounters with northern authorities to consolidate a 
local power base without overtly undermining adherence to the prevailing world order. 
 
The traditional relationship between Vietnam and China was a long time in the making. Its 
earliest incarnation involved the emergence of autonomous polities that grew out of political 
arrangements initially put in place by a distant and more powerful Chinese court. The period of 
state-building that resulted in the Âu Lạc kingdom (ca. 220-180 B.C.E.) was necessarily 
influenced by events to the north of the modern Sino-Vietnamese border region. The Âu Lạc 
kingdom's founder, Thục Phán, who was likely an outsider from the north, allied with several 
upland neighbors and led the military conquest of his lowland neighbor the Văn Lang kingdom, 
which was home to northern Vietnam's indigenous elite known in the sources as the Lac lords 
(Abadie 2001, 16; Ngô 1993 [1497], 1: 5a). A contributing factor to Thục Phán 's victory was the 
Qin (221-206 B.C.E.) military campaign into the borderlands region in 219 B.C.E. shortly after 
the founding of China's first empire (Taylor 1983, 17). Fierce fighting during the Qin military 
advance had devastated the region's old political order, and in the political chaos Thục Phán 
overcame the local elite and set up his own kingdom without completely driving the Lac lords 
out of the region (Taylor 1983, 20). The Văn Lang kingdom had no time to develop a lasting 
relationship with the northern Chinese court, because in 180 B.C.E. Thục Phán relinquished 
control of the region to Zhao Tuo (V. Triệu Đà, r. 207-137 B.C.E.), the Qin-appointed military 
commissioner for South China. I have included Zhao Tuo's Nanyue (V. Nam Việt) kingdom 
(204-111 B.C.E.) under the third equilibrium examined in this article, although the Nanyue was 
most assuredly weaker in absolute power than was the Han empire (206 B.C.E.-221 C.E.), 
successor to the Qin. 
 
Following the 111 Han defeat of Nanyue and the absorption of this territory into the northern 
empire, Chinese authorities planned to introduce into the region, which is today northern 
Vietnam, administrative practices modeled on the rest of the empire, but the regional rule was 
adjusted to produce maximum political stability and to minimize disturbance to the flow of trade 
through the region. Han authorities likely recognized the local authority of the Lạc lords as 
prefectural and district officials (Taylor 1983, 33). The Lạc lords in turn accepted titles from the 
Han court to enhance their prestige. By submitting tribute from their region, they built up an 
institutional relationship with the central court. Although the greater strength of the Han empire 
was evident, it mattered much less at the local level in Vietnam. Demographic changes 
originating in the north had a greater impact. An increasing number of elite families (officials, 
scholars) arrived in the south during the interim reign of Wang Mang (r. 9-23 C.E.). These 
immigrants, bearers of North China Plains culture, upset the laissez-faire policy established 
among Chinese settlers, officials, and the indigenous aristocracy, the Lạc lords (Holmgren 1980, 
2). The Lạc lords had drawn their own resources from the products the Han court wished to tax. 
Their regional authority also was challenged by social changes after the adoption of Chinese 
marriage practices. Eventually, they opposed the changes with force, resulting in the Trưng 
sisters (Hai Bà Trưng) rebellion of 39-43 C.E. (Ng6 1993 [1479], 3: 1b-3a). The failure of the 
Trưng sisters rebellion points to a lack of cohesion among the local aristocracy, a cohesion that 
didn't fully develop until centuries of contact with successive northern regimes had passed. In 
this phase, Weak Vietnam was unable to use the larger tributary relationship to any advantage, 
but was instead reacting to change implemented by outside authorities. 
 
In this category of Strong China/Weak Vietnam one must also consider the early Ming 
occupation of Vietnam, a period in which the Ming emperor Zhu Di (also the Yongle emperor) 
(1360-1424) for personal reasons exercised an aggressive frontier policy completely at odds with 
the more cautious policy of his father, the dynasty's founder. By the end of 1407 Ming forces had 
occupied most of the Đại Việt kingdom, although sporadic uprisings were not put down until 
1414. The Ming court made the mistake of sending mediocre officials to fill special posts in 
Vietnamese administration. However, leading Vietnamese families also provided many of the 
most able officials to serve in the Ming occupation government (Whitmore 1977, 64-65). These 
families faced harsh judgment in official Vietnamese historical accounts once the Chinese were 
driven out of Vietnam. Appointed Ming administrators also treated the occupation as an occasion 
for economic exploitation, which did not win them popular approval. The local resistance, led by 
Thanh Hóa native landholder and former official Lê Lợi (1385-1433), launched a series of 
attacks in 1418 on Chinese garrisons and supply lines, gradually wearing down Ming resolve. 
When Zhu Di died, his next two successors followed his occupation policy. However, by 1427, 
Ming court advisers recommended abandoning the occupation effort, citing the Ming founder's 
own opposition to military expeditions against the empire's neighbors. In 1428, Lê Lợi's 
supporters established a new court at Thăng Long, renamed Đông Kinh ("The Eastern Capital"), 
and the Ming court had recognized Lê Lợi as the legitimate ruler of a new dynasty. The Lê 
dynastic rulers would soon revive tributary relations with the Ming and adopt certain Ming court 
practices in the administration of the Lê state, but only after the threat of outside interference had 
been eliminated. As Keith Taylor has argued, the Ming court's dilemma was as follows. Vietnam 
had once been part of China and so should be able to be civilized; however, Chinese officials had 
come to the agreement that local Vietnamese would not accept this civilizing mission (Taylor 
1999, 150). The strong Ming empire seemingly had the resources to force its political will on 
Vietnam, but the materially weaker Đại Việt kingdom was not willing to accept this change in 
the relationship for long. Reviving tributary relations provided a more practical solution, and this 
"civilizing" issue was ultimately left undecided. 
 
Another example of the Strong China/Weak Vietnam equilibrium was the period marking the 
rise and fall of the Mạc Dynasty (1527–1677). The Mạc, which occupied the northernmost 
section of the Lê-controlled Đại Việt kingdom, competed directly with the Lê for resources and 
regional recognition. Shortly after the establishment of the Mạc, the Ming emperor sent a 
battalion of troops, calling for the capture of the kingdom's founder Mạc Đăng Dung (1483-
1541). Mạc Đăng Dung immediately decided to seek Ming support for his rule, and he rushed a 
mission to Beijing to gain recognition. The Ming court showed little interest in fully abandoning 
tributary links with the Lê, but Mạc Đăng Dung persisted. In 1540, sources note that he and his 
assistants crawled barefoot to the frontier camp of a Ming delegation as a sign of submission, 
offering records of his administration in five frontier prefectures near Lạng Sơn in exchange for 
peace at the border. The Ming court finally recognized this frontier region as the "Annan 
Protectorate Colonial Secretariat" (Annandu tongshisi) and Mạc Đăng Dung as a local magistrate 
(Zhang 1974, 321: 8334; Guangxi 1992, 96). This anachronistic use of the Tang period term 
"Annan" (the Pacified South) for Mạc territory reveals the heavy-handed manner with which the 
Ming court laid claim to this portion of the borderlands for inclusion into the Ming empire. 
However, Mạc Đăng Dung in 1530 had already abdicated his position of authority to his son, 
instead taking the title Thái thượng hoàng ("Ruler Emeritus") (Zhang 1974,321: 8330-8331). 
 
While his son continued to rule as "king" of Đại Việt kingdom, Mạc Đăng Dung served as a 
Ming frontier administrator, in effect claiming his territory existed both within and beyond the 
authority of the Ming court. Despite protests from the Lê court, the Ming court decided that the 
Mạc and the Lê should continue to rule Vietnam as co-vassals of the Ming empire. Thus began 
the period of Nam Bắc Triếu ("Southern and Northern Courts") (1533-1592). Exiled Lê leaders 
found support from Nguyễn Kim (1476-1545) and his son-in- law Trịnh Kiểm (1503-1570), 
members of powerful Thanh Hóa clans that hoped to take all of Vietnam from the Mạc. In 1532 
the Lê set up a court-in-exile in Laos. In 1540, the Lê rulers moved to Thanh Hoa and began to 
actively resist Mạc claims to national control. Nguyễn Kim was murdered during this same year, 
but the struggle continued. It took the Lê court forty-seven years before it was able to drive the 
Mạc out of the capital at Thâng Long in 1592. Even at this point, the Mạc lingered in the 
northern border region until 1677, and the territorial struggle between the now rival Nguyễn and 
Tṛinh clans during the Tây Sơn Rebellion (1771-1802) eclipsed any political relevance the Mạc 
continued to muster. In the context of the Strong China/Weak Vietnam equilibrium, the weaker 
southern regimes navigated within the framework of the tribute system imposed by stronger 
northern regimes, without effectively challenging the political will of the dominant Chinese 
leadership. The conditions for the relationship were set by the Chinese. The Vietnamese 
leadership, even in the midst of local political competition, had to adapt to these external 
conditions. 
 
Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Weak China/Strong Vietnam 
 
In this second equilibrium, absent undue influence from a dominant northern neighbor, local 
Vietnamese leaders turned frequently to local expressions of power and authority. The imperial 
model of Chinese dynasts was not the only source of political status; local leaders turned to 
upland communities of the frontier region for additional support. During periods of strong 
northern administrations, overwhelming military might from the north eventually defeated 
southern leaders who relied only on indigenous support to challenge imperial representatives. 
During periods of imperial decline, local leaders could briefly carve out independent polities, but 
these spheres of power would only last as long as the vacuum of military strength from the north 
remained unfilled. 
 
With the decline of the Han Dynasty, northern power and authority were greatly diminished. The 
effective independence of the Vietnamese region under Shi Xie (Sĩ Nhiếp) (137-226) flourished 
in this period. Shi Xie's family had earlier fled the Han usurper Wang Mang's reign (9-23), so he 
was an example of the region's Sino-Vietnamese elite. When Zhu Fu, the Eastern Han inspector 
of Jiaozhi (Giao Chỉ) the frontier territory located in modern-day northern Vietnam, was 
murdered in 196 in a local insurrection, Shi Xie took advantage of the turmoil to take effective 
control of the region, including Jiaozhi, Cưu Chan (the northern portion of central Vietnam), and 
the South China coastline, serving formally as the new inspector, but actually exercising 
autonomous control through several family members (Chen and Pei 1959,49: 1191). The 
territory under his control, reaching across Lingnan (modern-day Guangdong and Guangxi) to 
central Vietnam, closely resembled Nanyue's dimensions before this southern kingdom 
succumbed to early Han expansion. At this point, the late Han Dynasty was no longer strong 
enough to overcome assertion of local autonomy. The court attempted to reassert central control 
by dispatching another official and by promoting Jiaozhi to the status of a province in 203, but 
Shi Xie continued to hold real power (Taylor 1983, 72). With the final disintegration of the Han 
and the emergence of the intense political rivalry of the Three Kingdoms period, the Weak 
China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium entered a new phase, and a loose tributary bond was 
reintroduced in the relationship. Shi Xie chose to ally with Sun Quan (182-252), founder of the 
Eastern Wu Dynasty (229-280), and when the Wu's founding was announced in Nanjing, Shi Xie 
sent a large tribute mission north. By doing so, Shi Xie likely spared Jiaozhi direct attack from 
the expanding Wu, and gave the region time to develop independently for a while longer. 
Charles Holcombe notes that Shi Xie acted in a manner similar to the Northeast Asian Gongsun 
clan, which in this same period controlled the Liaodong Peninsula and issued tribute to the Wei 
court in an effort to stave off direct intervention (Holcombe 2001, 15). 
 
The Wu kingdom initially fostered good relations with Jiaozhi, and Sun Quan issued numerous 
titles to Shi Xie and his brothers. The Wu court also accepted luxury items from Jiaozhi, such as 
incense, bird feathers, and ivory, including items traded with other Southeast Asian maritime 
kingdoms. In 226, Shi Xie died, and his son Shi Hui (Sĩ Huy) (165-227) also received Wu 
patronage for a time. However, Sun Quan, acting on a memorial from his military commander 
Lu Dai (161-256), soon decided to divide the Shi clan's region of Jiaozhi into two domains: all 
northern territory along the coast of the important maritime entrepot Hepu was designated as 
Guangzhou, and all territory south of this point was designated as Jiaozhou (Chen and Pei 
1959,49: 1193). Lu Dai became the governor of Guangzhou, and another Wu official was 
appointed governor of Jiaozhou, effectively undermining the Shi family power base. Losing 
access to the important maritime trade passing through Hepu would have been a devastating 
blow by itself. Shi Hui attempted a revolt, but his forces were put down by Wu troops and the 
entire Shi clan was massacred in the aftermath (Chen and Pei 1959,49: 1193). Shi Xie and his 
clan had been favorably positioned to benefit from regional trade as long as the northern regime 
remained weak or distracted with other conflicts. Shi Xie had accepted titles of the Eastern Wu 
court, but the continued relationship between the Wu and the Shi clans does not appear to follow 
strict tributary protocol; instead it depended more on direct trade and personal patronage. Once 
these conditions changed, so did the Wu court's acceptance of this semiautonomous polity. 
 
Another historical example that fits the conditions of the Weak China/Strong Vietnam 
equilibrium developed with the fall of the Tang imperial house in the early tenth century. The 
Five Dynasties period was marked by the struggle in the post-Tang period for regional 
reunification under a state that could claim the authority the Tang rulers once wielded. As the 
Five Dynasties period progressed, however, reunification of the region seemed increasingly 
difficult, and "rulers focused on their own military and political experiences as they searched for 
solutions to the establishment of a strong central authority and loyal administration at the 
borders" (Anderson 2007, 41). In this political environment, various local military strongmen of 
the Red River delta struggled for control, and from this group emerged Ngô Quyền (r. 939-944). 
Ngô Quyền's title of authority, inherited from the late Tang period, was military commissioner 
(jiedushi) , which implied some degree of autonomy. As a military commissioner, Ngô Quyền 
claimed a source of political authority without relying on tributary ties, but he was also fortunate 
to amass a strong enough military force to fend off regional challengers. The northern 
Vietnamese territory was also claimed by the nearby Southern Han kingdom, administered from 
Guangzhou, the ancient power base of the Nanyue ruler Zhao Tuo and later Shi Xie. In the 
autumn of 938, Liu Hongcao, son of the Southern Han ruler Liu Gong (r. 917-942), led a military 
expedition against Ngô Quyền's forces, and Liu was soundly defeated in the Battle of Bạch Đằng 
River (Sima 1969,281: 9193). This famous battle proved to be a turning point in Sino-
Vietnamese relations, because an autonomous, or at least semiautonomous, Vietnamese polity 
would remain, with few exceptions, a reality for the Red River delta through the early modem 
era. 
 
Following his victory against the Southern Han forces, Ngô Quyền dropped all references to the 
title military commissioner, adopting the title of king (vương), and establishing his court at Cơ̂ 
Loa, the ancient capital of the aforementioned lowland Vietnamese Âu Lạc kingdom. The Ngô 
clan continued to maintain their stable control of the region from 939 to 965, until a rival local 
military leader, Đinh Bộ Lĩnh, wrested control of the region away from the Ngô and in 968 
founded Vietnam's first fully independent kingdom, the Đại Cồ Việt (Ngô 1993 [1479], 1: 2a-
2b). Under the conditions of this second equilibrium, local leaders attempted, at times 
unsuccessfully, to establish local political order without seeking accommodation within the 
framework of China's developing tribute system. With the fall of the Eastern Han court came an 
extended period of political disunion, and Chinese administration of the southern region had 
become ineffective by the late fifth century. In this environment a new class of local elites 
claiming control of Vietnam soon emerged. With the fall of the Tang, another shorter period of 
disunity resulted in the Five Dynasties period, and the period of Weak China resulted in a legacy 
of Vietnamese self-rule in the Red River delta that persisted through the premodern period. 
 
Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Strong China/Strong Vietnam 
 
Within the Strong China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium in relations, tributary bonds continued to 
provide the basis for court-to-court negotiations. However, under these conditions, the weaker 
(in an absolute sense) Vietnamese partner had the means for adapting tributary constraints to its 
own advantage. As mentioned above, the Nanyue kingdom along the southern frontier of the Qin 
and early Han empires was a strong example of this category of Sino-Vietnamese encounters and 
the border created by this southern polity provided a point of anxiety for successive northern 
regimes. Nanyue, although short-lived, would serve as a guide to future generations of 
Vietnamese leaders who sought to ground their own political autonomy in the glorious past 
(Anderson 2007, 35). Zhao Tuo, the first ruler of Nanyue, had originally been dispatched to the 
south by the Qin court, but sources note that he soon gained widespread support for his 
administration, despite his lack of lineage ties. Once his local backing was strong enough, and 
northern rulers were preoccupied with the violent Qin-Han dynastic transition, Zhao Tuo named 
himself martial king of Nanyue (nanyue wuwang), and later emperor of the territory, without 
seeking approval from any Chinese authorities (Sima 1969, 12: 394). As noted above, Zhao Tuo 
sent military forces into the Âu Lạc kingdom in 180 B.C.E., thus extending his influence over a 
territory that stretched from Guangzhou to the northern border of the modern-day Vietnamese 
province of Nghệ An (Sima 1999, 2976). Zhao Tuo's name for his kingdom, "Nanyue," 
suggested the ancient ethnonym "the Hundred Yue" (bai yue), a collective term for the various 
peoples south of the Yangtze River to the coastline of the Tongking Gulf. The Nanyue kingdom 
shared a border with several other smaller states, including the Minyue kingdom (334-110 
B.C.E.), later annexed into the eastern region of Nanyue; the Changsha kingdom, a Han 
protectorate along the Nanyue's northern frontier; and the autonomous Yelang kingdom (third 
century B.C.E.–first century C.E.) to the southwest. These kingdoms engaged in court-to-court 
relations with the more powerful Han court and they all received titles from the Han emperor, 
but the proximity of Nanyue and that kingdom's greater military strength was sufficient for Zhao 
Tuo to demand recognition from or the submission of these kingdoms (Zhang 1995, 130-131). 
However, the balance in relations between these southern kingdoms depended in part on the 
strength of the northern court. 
 
The militarily stronger Chinese court was never completely reconciled to the existence of a 
strong state on its southern frontier. In 196 B.C.E., the newly established Han empire had 
acknowledged Zhao Tuo's leadership by granting him the title king of Nanyue (nanyue wang), 
but in 185 B.C.E. the Han empress Lü, fearing Nanyue's growing regional strength, broke off 
trade links and had troops sent to the south (Ngô 1993 [1479], 2: 3a). Zhao Tuo responded by 
declaring himself emperor and seizing firm control of his neighboring kingdoms. The Han force 
was eventually recalled with the death of Empress Lü, and formal relations resumed with 
Nanyue, but the Strong China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium did not allow for the type of stable 
but asymmetrical relationship described by Brantly Womack. Ultimately, Nanyue would not 
survive Zhao Tuo's death in 137 B.C.E. and the transfer of power to his son in the face of the 
Han court's concerted effort to bring the region under northern control. In 112 B.C.E. the pro-
Han ruler Zhao Xing, whose father had once served in the Han court, was killed by anti-Han 
courtiers (Taylor 1983, 28). The Han emperor Wudi (r. 141-87 B.C.E.) had already assembled a 
large military force near the border, and this force attacked in response to the court turmoil, 
effectively putting an end to Nanyue's independence. However, the local elites, the Lạc lords, 
remained in power even after the Han took administrative control of the region, and, as noted 
earlier in this article, Lạc power was only eradicated following the Trưng sisters rebellion in 43 
C.E. This period of a strong and wealthy southern polity would remain an inspiration to 
Vietnamese leaders and a point of concern for Chinese rulers. Its vivid memory would shape the 
early nineteenth-century debate over an acceptable name for the newly unified kingdom of the 
Nguyễn court (1802-1945). The Qing court's refusal of the Nguyễn choice "Nam Việt" and the 
coining of the entirely new term "Việt Nam" were a direct result of the Strong China/Strong 
Vietnam legacy of this ancient state. 
 
A second example of the Strong China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium may be found in the mid-
eleventh century between the Song empire (968-1279) and the Đai Việt kingdom under the Lý 
court (1009-1225). From the fall of the Tang Dynasty in the late ninth century through the 
founding of the Song, a strong, independent polity emerged and developed under local leadership 
from the Red River region. Local elites from three successive Vietnamese ruling families, the 
Đinh (r. 968-980), the Lê (r. 980-1009), and the Lý clans, consolidated their regional control by 
maintaining relations with the Song court within the tributary framework while competing with 
others, even their own kinsmen, for local dominance. Chinese efforts to increase their regional 
influence through military intervention in 980 ended in failure. Eventually, the Chinese court 
acceded to the new political landscape. At that point, the founder of the Lý Dynasty, Lý Công 
Uẩn (r. 1010-1028), would initiate a very different style of rule. Early on Lý rulers had 
enthusiastically modeled their court on the Chinese imperial example, but they would eventually 
rename their kingdom without seeking Chinese approval. When Lý Công Uẩn in the late summer 
of 1010 established his new capital at an ancient citadel renamed Thăng Long, on the site of 
modern-day Hà Nội, the Vietnamese ruler signaled a shift in the center of power away from the 
coastal focus of the Đinh-Lê capital Hao Lu in the lower delta region. At the same time the Lý 
leadership expanded into the northern region, coming into closer contact with the upland 
communities in the frontier areas. 
 
These encounters would finally bring Chinese and Vietnamese interests together in a period of 
conflict by the mid-eleventh century. Growing tensions at the frontier were largely the product of 
shifting demography and local disturbances (Hoàng and Hà 2003, 127). Chinese settlers were 
streaming south at the same time that the Lý rulers consolidated control over native borderlands 
settlements (Anderson 2007, 123-124). Political events at Thang Long seemed to indicate that 
the Lý leadership was anxious to firm up a physical divide before the Song empire extended any 
farther south. By 1069, Lý Nhật Tôn (r. 1054-1072) felt confident enough to change the official 
name of the kingdom from Đai Cồ Việt to the strictly Sino-Vietnamese Đai Việt, a name that 
Vietnamese rulers would retain until the end of World War II, and he dropped all references to 
the Song reign periods in his court proclamations (Toghto et al. 1983, 488: 14069). Such 
behavior was deemed provocative by the Song court and within a few years, China and Vietnam 
were on the brink of war. In 1075, anticipating an attack from Song forces, the court regent and 
military commander Lý Thường Kiệt (1019-1105) led an attack on two fronts, sea and land, 
against southern China. Thường Kiệt laid siege to the Yongzhou garrison (modem-day Nanning) 
and captured it, causing many of its defenders to commit suicide. When the Song court launched 
a counterattack in late 1076, Lý Thường Kiệt set up his defenses to the north of Thăng Long and 
prevented invading armies from occupying the capital. By 1086 a clear border had been mapped 
out between the two states-the first such court-negotiated border in China's history. After the 
establishment of this court-negotiated border, there would still be challenges to the Đai Việt's 
insistence on self-rule. However, the existence of a formal border between the two polities was 
successfully challenged only once in the next eight hundred years. 
 
As David Kang mentions in his recent book, the one Great War between Vietnam and China in 
the last six hundred years was the early Ming invasion of the Đai Việt kingdom (Kang 2010, 99). 
It was in this period of relative peace that the founders of both the Lê Dynasty (1428-1788) and 
the Nguyễn Dynasty (1802-1945) engaged with their northern neighbor under the conditions of 
the Strong China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium. One might debate whether the early Lê state 
should be placed in this category, but the strong Vietnamese state-building efforts after thwarting 
the Ming's occupation efforts are indicative of this third equilibrium. It is generally accepted in 
modem Vietnamese scholarship that the founders of the Lê Dynasty saw essential differences 
between Vietnamese and Chinese cultures, suddenly as plain as the mountains and rivers that 
divided the two regions. I agree with Liam Kelley that the new leadership at Đông Kinh regarded 
its mandate to rule as a validated intellectual and moral order shared by northern and southern 
regimes alike (Kelley 2005, 19-20). Even if proclamations of the early Lê court presented 
Chinese and Vietnamese political pasts as clearly separated, common values such as those 
expressed through the performance of tributary protocol, for example, held the two regions 
together in a special bond. The early Lê leadership accepted that Chinese norms of rulership 
shaped regimes both north and south of the existing frontier. The same conditions held true with 
the founding of the Nguyễn Dynasty, although external forces would eventually undermine the 
foundations of the existing relationship. In June of 1803, the Qing court granted Nguyễn Ánh, 
the Gia Long emperor (r. 1802-1820) to his own subjects, ritual investiture as king. The 
Vietnamese ruler had, late in the previous year, sent an envoy to Beijing for formal 
acknowledgment of his new realm. The Qing court had famously given the Nguyễn permission 
to call their dominion Việt Nam, and not Nam Việt, but this innovative title for the new 
kingdom, and future name for the nation-state, would be subsequently ignored by both parties. 
When the Nguyễn established its court at Huế, the new government proceeded to refer to its 
realm domestically as "the Great South" (Đại Nam), while the Qing court, as Alexander 
Woodside noted, revived the anachronistic term "the Pacified South" (An Nam) (Woodside 
1988, 120-121). Nguyễn Ánh had, with Western-including French-assistance, successfully 
defeated the lingering Tây Sơn defenses to once again unite the northern and southern territories 
of the kingdom. This foreign assistance came at a price, and by the mid-nineteenth century the 
French were more involved in Vietnam than any European power in the region. In 1884 French 
authorities at the signing of the Treaty of Huế took the imperial seal given Nguyễn Ánh by the 
Qing emperor and melted it down, marking an end to the 2,000-year-old special bond between 
China and Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship had been brought to an end by 
an outside power, and the new relationship, while still bearing traces of the old order, would be 
subject to new political pressures and regional challenges. 
 
The premodern Strong China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium, including the institutions of tributary 
relations that stemmed from a common political culture, had once allowed the resilient, and 
hardly fool-hardy, Lê leaders to reject direct intervention from the Ming emperor while opting to 
remain within the historical relationship that informed the authority expressed in both courts. The 
early Nguyễn court, before unrelenting pressure from French colonial expansion, could locate 
themselves within the political hierarchy dictated by Qing tributary practices in a manner that 
enhanced their local authority to rule. Under the conditions of the third equilibrium, Vietnamese 
rulers often returned to the framework of tributary ties even when the Vietnamese polity was 
able to present a formidable military defense in the face of northern aggression. The Đinh, 
former Lê (980-1009), and Lý courts had all entered into tributary relations with the Chinese 
court, but each Vietnamese leadership approached this relationship somewhat differently. As the 
recipients of a long, varied history of political interaction with northern powers, these leaders 
from the northern Vietnamese region all understood the variety of roles available to satisfy the 
expectations of distant emperors. Yet when all options within the tributary relationship were 




The Sino-Vietnamese relationship was both an element of the larger Chinese tribute system and 
also a separate and self-contained relationship following its own logic of development. In a study 
of this relationship, the researcher is obliged to consider two dimensions of analysis: the 
temporally specific court-directed acts construed as tributary behavior in a ritual context, and 
localized frontier-situated competitions for political and economic control. Moreover, the 
historical documents that recorded these events were passed to us with their own interpretative 
problems. Citing the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Catherine Bell notes that the context of practice 
rarely comes to us as a clear picture, but instead is presented to us "full of indeterminacy, 
ambiguities, and equivocations" (Bell 1993, 83; Bourdieu 1977, 5-6, 14-15). In both the Chinese 
and Vietnamese historical records, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship played an important role in 
shaping the cultural identities of these two societies even through the modern age. However, the 
dynamic nature of this relationship is found well below the surface of its existing record. 
 
Under the conditions of the Strong China/Strong Vietnam and Strong China/Weak Vietnam 
equilibriums, hierarchical relations and a schedule of interaction dictated by tributary protocol 
were both important factors. Concerning the Weak China/Strong Vietnam equilibrium, these 
factors played a less important role in the decision-making of the Vietnamese leadership, but 
even then a Vietnamese leader could not completely disregard the self-image of the Chinese 
court. In this article we have observed that the Chinese emperor and his advisers viewed 
themselves as guardians of an ideal system of state-to-state relations preserved in the ritual 
elements of Confucianism's imperial cult. This ancient court culture contained within it a 
hierarchical element. For the term hierarchical, I turn to Louis Dumont's work Homo 
Hierarchicus, in which Dumont defines the term as a "principle by which the elements of a 
whole are ranked in relation to the whole" (Dumont 1966, 66). Dumont notes that most societies 
professing this view of the whole are religious in nature. Because the role of a Chinese emperor 
as the Son of Heaven was quasi-religious, this distinction still satisfies the conditions of the 
traditional Chinese notion of world order. As the guardian of presumably ancient practices 
thought to have universal appeal, the Chinese court placed itself at the forefront of a system of 
states and lesser polities extant at any particular time beside and beyond its borders. 
 
Moreover, there was the issue of the temporal order established when the Chinese emperor 
followed his calendar to schedule the regular submission of tribute by the various vassal states. 
As Alexander Woodside notes in a more modern context, "the command of time, and the 
definition of time, can be as significant a part of the development of power as the command of 
space or money" (Woodside 1998, 191). The emperor ordered time with the regular performance 
of his duties just as he ordered space with the positioning of his person. Therefore, the adoption 
of reign periods and localized calendars by supposedly subordinated neighboring states was a 
gesture of impertinence, perhaps even a negation of the emperor's own position. Vietnamese 
rulers who took this course of action did so at their own peril. In this context, tribute was the 
organizational focus of court-to-court relations that functioned through centuries of evolution 
and development as a method of ordering and harmonizing interchange between political bodies. 
However, as the defender of this system, the Chinese court itself was under the constraints of the 
ideal order it espoused. The hierarchical whole of the tribute system, of which each participating 
tributary state was a part, also encircled the Chinese court. Because the ultimate authority of the 
Chinese emperor expressed itself in the achievement of regional peace and harmony, the emperor 
needed the regular performance of tribute missions from each participating state to promulgate 
his own legitimacy. 
 
The modern Sino-Vietnamese relationship shares a dynamic quality with its premodern 
incarnation, even if the diplomatic principles underpinning the relationship have fully changed. 
The modern relationship is also shaped by the recent emergence of China as a regional power. 
Southeast Asian nations, to confront China's growing influence in the region, are choosing at 
times to ally with, and at other times to line up against, their northern neighbor (Roy 2005, 305-
322). China does not currently claim a "Monroe Doctrine" for the region. Instead, Beijing claims 
historical precedent as reason enough to reassert claims to southern territories and southern 
resources-for example, see the regional controversy surrounding China's territorial claims 
involving the "Nine Dash Line" in the South China Sea (Nan Hai)/Biển Dông. China also has 
one of the fastest growing military forces in the world, and Beijing recently acquired an aircraft 
carrier to assist in establishing a blue-water navy. The impact of direct military intervention from 
China would be substantial and likely destabilizing in Southeast Asia (Mearsheimer 2010, 395). 
Sea routes through the region have become more and more important for trade, as the lifeblood 
of these growing economies. China understood the importance of these routes in the early 
fifteenth century. With increased technological-military capabilities, the Beijing government 
could exercise greater control, unless the United States brokers some cooperation between the 
PRC and ASEAN. 
 
As for the future of Sino-Vietnamese relations, arguments have been made since earlier in the 
decade that Vietnam could serve as a "buffer zone" between China and Southeast Asia. The Bush 
administration and now the Obama administration have shown interest in building up Vietnam's 
military, particularly naval, capability to a point just strong enough to monitor Chinese activity in 
the region and ultimately slow a Chinese intrusion (Cheng 2011,387). However, Sino-ASEAN 
relations have in general steadily improved and the relationship between China and Vietnam has 
remained consistently cordial. In November 2009, Beijing and Hanoi signed agreements to 
culminate over three decades of border negotiations (Cheng 2011, 385-386). Despite popular 
protest in Hanoi, Vietnam and China have made some progress in addressing disputes over the 
Paracel and Spratley islands, although fundamental differences remain. A Strong China/Strong 
ASEAN equilibrium may be on the rise, with maximum flexibility for all actors involved. 
Although such predictions are well beyond the scope of this study, the varied nature of the 
historical Sino-Vietnamese relationship presents options. 
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